



he purpose of this chapter is to explain
how social divergence affects labour
productivity and total factor produc-
tivity (TFP).
1 We deﬁne social divergence as
the social barriers to communication among
social groups and hypothesize that social
divergence inhibits the growth and diffusion
of knowledge, which, in turn, lowers TFP and
labour productivity. Social divergence may be
proxied by the number of social groups and
the “distance” between them in an economy.
In practice, proxies may include inequality
measures of income, wealth and education,
and societal differences in terms of religion,
language and ethnicity. These differences
across groupings, all other things being equal,
increase the social barriers to communication
that, in turn, prevent the exchange of ideas
that enhance productivity and contribute to
economic performance.
Despite difficulties in measuring TFP
over time and across countries (Diewert 2000),
analyses of the factors that cause (or are asso-
ciated with) productivity changes are becom-
ing increasingly important, and conclusions
based on such evaluations are used to justify
a range of economic and social policy initia-
tives. In Canada, various explanations have
been offered to explain domestic TFP per-
formance, particularly in comparison with its
southern neighbour.
2 Harris (2002) lists 13
variables possibly associated with TFP,
including marginal tax rates, the rate of inﬂa-
tion, income inequality, labour mobility and
the size of the public sector. We broaden this
debate to focus on social divergence and “make
a connection” that may help to explain some
of the cross-country differences in TFP and
other stylized facts.
This chapter is a ﬁrst step in examining
the extent to which social barriers to commu-
nication across groups determine productivity
differences. The objectives of the study are
twofold: to place the notion of social diver-
gence in the context of the existing literature,
and to provide some preliminary empirical evi-
dence on the effects of different aspects of social
divergence on TFP and labour productivity.
First, we deﬁne the concept of social divergence
and outline hypotheses as to why it may nega-
tively affect TFP. Then, we move on to con-



































































R. Quentin Grafton, Stephen Knowles
and P. Dorian Owen
Grafton et al. text  11/27/02  2:18 PM  Page 203such as social cohesion, social diversity and, in
particular, social capital. A key aim of this
comparison is to emphasize the distinct and
sharp focus of social divergence compared to
broad, encompassing concepts like social capi-
tal. The study also provides a review of the
social capital literature related to economic per-
formance to highlight the differences between
social capital and social divergence and their
expected impacts on TFP. The review of past
work provides a point of departure to the pres-
entation of new empirical results on the statis-
tical relationships between social divergence
and TFP and labour productivity. The prelim-
inary nature of these results provides an oppor-
tunity to discuss the need for further research
and the policy implications of the study, espe-
cially for Canada. The concept of social diver-
gence, the preliminary evidence of its impact
on TFP and labour productivity, and its policy
implications are reviewed in the concluding
remarks.
SOCIAL DIVERGENCE AND 
TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY
The ﬁrst step in appreciating the
importance of social divergence is to observe
that humans (and other primates) have a ten-
dency to associate and communicate with
others with whom they can identify. Group
identiﬁcation of “like with like” occurs on
multiple levels and on both a social and a pro-
fessional basis. In traditional and pre-literate
societies, bonds between members of groups
are often based on kinship (Dunbar 1996). In
modern societies, however, the bonds within
groups may arise from various commonalities.
For example, people often associate with oth-
ers in the same age group and of similar
income or levels of wealth, cultural back-
ground, education and marital status.
From our observation of the like-with-
like association in human behaviour, we
hypothesize that the greater the similarity of
social characteristics between individuals, the
lower the social barriers to communication.
We further hypothesize that the lower the
social barriers to communication in terms of
costs or effort, time and dissonance associat-
ed with social interactions, for a given level
of potential gain from specialization, the
higher the incidence of mutually beneﬁcial
knowledge exchange. In other words, social
barriers to communication across groups —
social divergence — may prevent individu-
als from transcending their knowledge set
and hinder “cooperation among highly spe-
cialized workers that enables advanced
economies to utilize a vast amount of knowl-
edge” (Becker and Murphy 1992, 1144). If
religious, ethnic, educational, wealth or other
social characteristics hinder communication
across groups, the economic impact is likely to
be greater on long-term TFP than on factor
accumulation. This is partly because spillovers
of technological knowledge between agents are
likely to be more important than spillovers
from factor accumulation, given that “techno-
logical knowledge is inherently more nonrival
and nonexcludable than factor accumulation”
(Easterly and Levine 2001, 208). Thus com-
munication barriers that arise from social diver-
gence, and that hinder disembodied technical
change, are likely to be signiﬁcant impedi-
ments to technological progress.
Barriers to communication can be charac-
terized in terms of the conﬁguration of networks
linking individuals in a society. This view is con-
sistent with recent work in network sociology
showing that the structure of networks has a
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including information, that ﬂow through them
(e.g., Burt 2000; Moody and White 2000).
3 In
particular, social networks are more important
in the transfer of “tacit knowledge/know how”
than “explicit knowledge/know what” (Brown
and Duguid 2000). Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the
potential effects of social divergence. In Figure
1, social divergence prevents communication
between individuals in group A and individuals
in group B. We assume no social barriers to com-
munication between individuals within a group
and, in this extreme example, suppose that social
barriers to communication are so prohibitive that
no communication links exist between the two
groups. Thus, with social divergence there are
only two productivity-enhancing exchanges or
communication links in the whole society.
Figure 2, by contrast, shows that in the absence
of social divergence there are six communication
links.
4
The ﬁgures illustrate the potential
“increasing returns” in the number of exchanges
from a decline in social barriers and social com-
munication costs across groups. For example, for
an economy with N individuals, there exist
N(N-1)/2 possible pair-wise communication
links. If the economy were divided into M social
groups, each containing the same number of
individuals, with no communication links across
groups, then the maximum possible number of
pair-wise communication links within each
group would be only N(N-M)/2M
2 and for the
society as a whole N(N-M)/2M, which is strict-
ly less than N(N-1)/2, if M is greater than one.
Thus, the larger the economy (deﬁned by N)
and the number of social groups (M), the greater
the potential beneﬁts from a lowering of social
barriers to communication, all other things
being equal.
5An ideal economy is one with large
complementarities in knowledge across indi-
viduals but with low social barriers to commu-
nication, so as to maximize both the number
and the quality of exchanges between individu-
als and across social groups.
The social divergence view has common-
alities to Lazear (1999), who argues that a com-
mon culture increases the pool of potential
trading partners; the lack of a common culture
inhibits the circle of contacts, which may leave
economies of scale unexploited. Lazear focuses
speciﬁcally on a common language, with an
emphasis on opportunities to trade. The social
divergence hypothesis, by contrast, emphasizes
that the lack of a common culture will create
communication barriers, inhibiting the diffusion
205
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ity. The notion of social divergence is also con-
sistent with the empirical work of McCallum
(1995) and Helliwell (1999), who show that bor-
der effects reduce trade ﬂows by up to a factor of
20 for the United States and Canada, despite a
free-trade agreement. Similar results have been
found for the European Union (Nitsch 2000) and
are consistent with the ﬁnding that a common
language signiﬁcantly increases trade densities
between countries (Wei 1996). These studies do
not focus on social divergence, but it seems like-
ly that if differences in culture reduce trade, they
will also create communication barriers.
Closer to our interpretation of social
divergence are aspects of a theoretical model
developed by Gradstein and Justman (2000) to
examine the role of state schooling, as a source
of common socialization, in reducing the social
distance between individuals. They assume
that the social distance between agents affects
the productivity of human capital in transac-
tions, citing Lazear’s arguments but also refer-
ring in general terms to empirical work on
social capital and the effects of ethnic hetero-
geneity. However, apart from a passing com-
ment that their focus is “the negative impact
of economic performance of people lacking the
means to communicate effectively with each
other” (fn. 4), they do not consider the broad-
er implications in any detail.
Social barriers can also affect the rate of
technological progress through the misalloca-
tion of skills across occupations. Galor and
Tsiddon (1997) examine the relationship
between technical progress and wage inequali-
ty. In their model, the rate of technological
progress and growth is determined by inter-
generational earnings mobility, while technical
progress, in turn, plays a part in determining
the evolution of earnings inequality and inter-
generational earnings mobility. Although not
explicitly modelled, their analysis suggests that
social barriers to mobility may distort the allo-
cation of skills across occupations, hence reduc-
ing the rate of technological innovation and
growth. From a social divergence viewpoint, a
lack of social mobility will also reduce techno-
logical progress because it reinforces barriers to
communication, hindering the implementation
of best-practice techniques.
Social divergence does not imply that it is
desirable for every individual to be identical.
Some degree of diversity is likely to be beneﬁcial;
indeed, the value of communication between peo-
ple of different backgrounds has long been rec-
ognized.
6 However, our contention is that the
extent of communication barriers is an increasing
function of the social distance between individu-
als, and that — other than, possibly, at relatively
low levels of social distance — the negative effects
of diversity on TFP will dominate any potential
gains from diversity.
7 A key point is that social
divergence tends to impede the exchange of infor-
mation, regardless of the extent and distribution
of potential productivity payoffs, partly because
such payoffs are unknown due to the lack of com-
munication between groups. Thus social diver-
gence, by increasing the social barriers to
communication, prevents productivity-enhanc-
ing exchanges between social groups, even if such
potential beneﬁts are greater for across-group
interactions than within-group interactions.
SOCIAL DIVERGENCE AND SOCIAL
CAPITAL
To fully understand the concept of social
divergence we must review a number of relat-
ed concepts (e.g., social cohesion, social exclu-
sion, social capital, social capability, social
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These related concepts, associated with soci-
etal features of interactions between individ-
uals and groups, have become widely used in
theoretical and empirical work in the social
sciences in recent years and have also become
central to public policy discussions. Given
the range of existing labels, the introduction
of yet another — social divergence —
requires some justiﬁcation. Our view is that
social divergence is both different from and
more focused than existing concepts. A par-
ticular concern with several of these is their
vagueness, as reﬂected in a worryingly long
list of alternative deﬁnitions for the same
entity, leading some to wonder whether we
can “trust” such concepts (Sobel 2002).
8
The term “social cohesion,” for example,
has been variously applied — with different
meanings — in the social sciences. In sociolo-
gy, it has been deﬁned as outcomes of process-
es whereby individuals become linked to social
systems (Barchas and Mendoza 1984). It has
also been deﬁned in terms of network connec-
tivity, as “the minimum number of actors who,
if removed from a group, would disconnect the
group” (Moody and White 2000, ii); cohesive
groups are those that are well-connected and
difficult to break apart. Ritzen et al. (2000)
deﬁne social cohesion as “a state of affairs in
which a group of people…demonstrate an
aptitude for collaboration that produces a cli-
mate for change” (6). In other words, it occurs
when individuals and groups have the means,
willingness and opportunity to collectively par-
ticipate in improving society. According to
Ritzen et al., “social exclusion” and social cohe-
sion can be viewed as “two sides of a coin,”
with the main causes of social exclusion
ascribed to poverty, unemployment, lack of
access to rights, and development that com-
promises future generations. Any attempt to
reconcile the differences in and linkages
between deﬁnitions for the various concepts is
beyond the scope of this paper. However, it
should be noted that none of these interpreta-
tions of social cohesion or social exclusion high-
lights the barriers to communication, and the
consequent implications for TFP, that result
from social divergence.
Most views of social cohesion (Berger-
Schmitt 2000) and other broadly deﬁned concepts
such as “social capability” (Temple and Johnson
1998) explicitly or implicitly embrace social cap-
ital as an important dimension. We therefore con-
centrate, in the rest of this section, on social
capital as an example of a concept with a broad
(and malleable) deﬁnition and compare it with
the more focused notion of social divergence.
Trust and Ease of Cooperation
Paldam (2000) identiﬁes three “families”
of deﬁnitions of social capital, those based on
“trust,” “ease of cooperation” and “networks.”
Putnam (1993) emphasizes ease of cooperation
in his earlier deﬁnition of social capital as the
“features of social organization…that facilitate
coordination and cooperation for mutual ben-
eﬁt” (35-36); this is reﬂected in his choice of
the density of voluntary organizations and the
extent of associational activity as proxies for
social capital. Others (e.g., Fukuyama 1995;
Knack 2001) stress the importance of trust,
particularly “generalized” or “wide-radius”
trust, for national economic performance; this
is mirrored in the widespread use of survey
measures of trust in empirical work (e.g., Zak
and Knack 2001). Paldam (2000) argues that,
together trust, which he views as constituting
the “deepest deﬁnition of social capital,” (629)
and cooperative behaviour form “a solid basis
for social capital” (636).
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distinctions can be drawn within the concept.
James (2002), for example, distinguishes
between trust that is fostered through incentives
and trust whereby “players retain a vulnerabili-
ty to the actions and choices of others” (293). The
former is the type of trust that can be engendered
through reward and/or enforcement mechanisms,
as represented in prisoner’s dilemma games by
changing preferences, by introducing explicit or
implicit contracts, or through repetition. The lat-
ter is closer to what is popularly regarded as trust.
Durlauf (1997) argues that trustworthiness is
“cooperative behavior that occurs in the absence
of either an enforcement mechanism or the
prospect of future reward, and is perhaps better
thought of as an internalized ethical norm,” but
“[e]xplaining ethical behavior is very different
than explaining adherence to socially-enforced
norms” (262). The point is that broadly deﬁned
labels may obscure subtle but important differ-
ences among various mechanisms. If the aim is
to analyze the implications of or to promote the
notion of different types of trust, then a more
focused approach is desirable.
Zak and Knack’s (2001) model, which
examines the role of social distance, or “social
heterogeneity,” in building generalized trust,
illustrates an important difference between
trust-based social capital and social divergence.
In their principal (investor)-agent (broker)
model, the greater the social distance between
randomly matched investors and brokers, the
greater the likelihood that cheating will occur.
Investors can forego resources to monitor their
investments and hence check on the honesty of
brokers. Zak and Knack’s approach is based on
the existence of transactions costs in monitor-
ing and enforcing contracts, but it does not
capture the barriers to communication that
result from social divergence, nor does it
address the importance of these barriers in hin-
dering disembodied technical change. The eco-
nomic importance of social divergence lies in
the reduced exchange of ideas and knowledge,
rather than in the increased transactions costs
associated with the exchange and enforcement
of property rights.
Networks
More recently, there has been an empha-
sis on the “networks” interpretation of social
capital, as epitomized by Putnam’s (2000)
more encompassing deﬁnition of social capital
as “connections among individuals — social
networks, and the norms of reciprocity and
trustworthiness that arise from them” (19).
Paldam (2000) takes a positive view: “The net-
work deﬁnition ﬁts rather well into the trust-
cooperation deﬁnitions. Everything might be
shades of and approaches to the very same basic
phenomenon” (641). By contrast, Woolcock
(2001) argues that deﬁnitions of social capital
should emphasize its sources (“norms and net-
works that facilitate collective action”) rather
than its consequences (e.g., trust).
9 A disad-
vantage of any all-encompassing deﬁnition of
social capital is that it encourages researchers
to regard beliefs, behavioural norms and net-
works as capable of being lumped together,
which obscures different potential mecha-
nisms and effects (Dasgupta 2000).
Unpacking the different elements con-
tained in encompassing concepts such as social
capital or social cohesion requires a sharper
focus on the various mechanisms involved in
economic performance. This is one of the moti-
vations for the speciﬁc focus, in the social diver-
gence approach, on social impediments to
interaction among individuals and the
exchange of the ideas and knowledge that lead
to innovation and diffusion of productivity-
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10 Social divergence is more
closely associated with the “networks” view
than the trust, norms or cooperation aspects of
social capital, but its focus is information ﬂows
and the impediments that arise due to “frac-
tures” in the network structure resulting from
different dimensions of social distance.
Social divergence can also have direct
effects on economic performance, unrelated to
the trust-civic engagement axis included in
most deﬁnitions of social capital (a point seen by
Knack [2001] as a criticism of using measures of
ethnic diversity, inequality, etc., as proxies for
social capital). For example, Temple and Johnson
(1998) argue that a robust correlation between
their index of mass communications and growth
could exist because the former is a good proxy for
the level of civic engagement, as measured by
the World Values Survey data on trust and
membership in associations. From the viewpoint
of the concept of social divergence, however, no
indirect effect is required. Mass communications
reduce the physical barriers to communications
that partly mitigate social divergence and thus
can promote the exchange of ideas and knowl-
edge that lead to TFP gains.
Bonding, Bridging and Linking
Social Capital
Although they are different concepts,
social divergence and social capital are
nonetheless related. For example, different
dimensions of social divergence (ethnic diver-
sity, income inequality, etc.) will affect lev-
els of trust and civic engagement (Zak and
Knack 2001). Further, a networks perspec-
tive of social capital, including the distinc-
tion between “bonding,” “bridging” and
“linking” social capital (Woolcock 2001;
Narayan 1999; Putnam 2000), complements
the focus of social divergence.
Bonding social capital involves linkages
(usually “strong ties”) within groups of like-
minded individuals (e.g., families, clans, gangs),
corresponding to denser, more localized net-
works. In this sense, bonding social capital is
similar to the idea, ﬁrst formulated by Davis
(1967), that a society can be divided into clus-
ters whereby within-group cooperation does
occur but group-to-group cooperation does not.
Bridging social capital involves linkages, usual-
ly somewhat “weaker,” among heterogeneous
groups. Linking social capital refers to “vertical”
connections among different strata in a hierar-
chical structure, with respect to, for example,
wealth or power. Social divergence focuses on
dimensions of social distance that act as imped-
iments to linkages among groups; these are like-
ly to be reﬂected in lower levels of bridging and
linking social capital among groups distributed
along the relevant dimensions of social distance.
Knack (2001) notes that such factors affect not
only overall trust levels but also the radius of
trust; for example, in ethnically diverse societies
there may be high levels of trust within ethnic
groups but low levels of generalized (wide-
radius) trust. Impediments to like-with-like
interactions, while suggesting a lack of bridg-
ing and linking social capital, are not necessari-
ly associated with high levels of bonding social
capital. For example, groups with low income
or educational levels are less likely to have strong
within-group identiﬁcation than, say, minority
ethnic groups.
The fact that social distance with regard
to dimensions such as ethnolinguistic or reli-
gious background can have an adverse effect on
productivity does not imply — it should be
emphasized — that social homogeneity is opti-
mal. Diversity is a source of potential gain
from specialization and exchange. The essence
of the social divergence argument is that social
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actors or groups of transactors will, to some
degree, prevent the beneﬁts of diversity from
being realized. The challenge for Canada and
other socially diverse countries is to overcome,
through institutional improvements, the
impediments to communication among groups
with different ethnic, religious, educational or
resource characteristics, in order to achieve the
full social and economic beneﬁts of diversity.
INDICATORS OF SOCIAL 
DIVERGENCE
We hypothesize that social barriers to
communication can result from differences in
ethnolinguistic background, religion, income
or asset holdings, educational attainment and
national boundaries. Each of these variables
has been featured, usually in a piecemeal fash-
ion, in theoretical and empirical studies of eco-
nomic growth. For most of the variables,
different mechanisms have been hypothesized
to explain the connection with growth. These
indicators are brieﬂy discussed below, togeth-
er with some details of relevant empirical
work and the speciﬁc measures used to proxy
the different aspects of social divergence.
Ethnic and Religious Diversity
The economic effects of polarization of soci-
eties along ethnic lines have received considerable
attention in the development literature, and many
of the issues are also applicable to developed
economies. The main mechanism by which eth-
nic diversity affects output growth is usually
argued to be an excessive rent-seeking focus on the
distribution of output among competing interest
groups, determined by ethnic background, at the
expense of policies that are growth-promoting.
11
Fractionalized interests are reﬂected in
incentives by local and national governments
that lead to sub-optimal outcomes such as a
lower quality and quantity of public goods
(Alesina et al. 1999), lower educational lev-
els (Goldin and Katz 1999), political insta-
bility (Mauro 1995), vulnerability to external
terms-of-trade shocks (Rodrik 1999) and
lower levels of trust (Zak and Knack 2001;
Alesina and La Ferrara 2000). Barro (1997,
72) also observes that such diversity may
reduce the likelihood of a society becoming
or remaining a democracy. Where democracy
does not exist, development-impeding institu-
tions may form a “trap” whereby exploitive
institutions and severe inequities are mutually
reinforced (Grafton and Rowlands 1996). More
generally, social polarization (usually charac-
terized by the existence of a small number of
similarly sized groups that differ markedly on
a range of attributes) may reduce the stability
of government decision-making (Keefer and
Knack 2000), leading to increased uncertainty.
This in turn is compensated for by investors
investing in less risky enterprises.
Easterly (2001a) observes that the impact
of ethnic diversity on economic growth hinges
on a society’s institutions: the poorer the qual-
ity of those institutions, the more adverse the
impact. Unfortunately, “good” institutions are
less likely to exist in a society characterized by
ethnic diversity. Even where institutional struc-
tures are relatively well developed, the expect-
ed productivity of rent-seeking activity is a key
determinant; for example, Osborne (2000)
notes that a well-established and accessible legal
system (usually regarded as useful in protecting
property rights) may encourage rent-seeking
activity through litigation, so that redistribu-
tional tendencies, while less obvious, may still
be present.
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(some of which use US data), cross-country
empirical evidence supports the view that
ethnolinguistic diversity is a predictor of con-
ﬂict, political instability, and growth-retard-
ing institutions and policies (Easterly and
Levine 1997). Nettle (2000) ﬁnds a signiﬁ-
cant negative association between linguistic
diversity and the level of per capita GDP.
12
Easterly and Levine’s work is representative
of most cross-country studies of the effects of
ethnic diversity in using an index of ethno-
linguistic fractionalization (ELF), developed
by Soviet researchers and ﬁrst used in the
growth literature by Mauro (1995). The ELF
index measures the probability that two ran-
domly selected individuals in a country
belong to different ethnolinguistic groups.
13
From the perspective of social divergence,
ethnolinguistic differences should affect TFP
and disembodied technical progress rather
than investments of physical inputs into the
production process, although these mecha-
nisms are not mutually exclusive.
The argument that religion affects eco-
nomic performance dates back to Max Weber’s
arguments concerning the “Protestant ethic.”
In this vein, proportions of the population that
belong to major religious groups are some-
times included in estimated models explaining
growth and related variables; for example,
Barro (1997) provides evidence of an associa-
tion between religious affiliation and democ-
racy. He observes that Protestant countries are
almost exclusively democratic while Islamic
nations are not. Zak and Knack (2001) observe
that “[t]wo of the three hierarchical religion
variables — percent Catholic and percent
Muslim — are negatively and signiﬁcantly
associated with trust” (310). Religious diver-
sity is conventionally measured using a
Herﬁndahl-style index by summing the
squared proportions of the population account-
ed for by each religious group (Grafton et al.
2001; Paldam 2001). The effects of religious
diversity are often considered together with
ethnolinguistic differences — for example,
with respect to the potential for political and
social instability and the other effects noted
above. By contrast, there is some evidence that
religious diversity may reduce corruption, with
positive consequences for economic perform-
ance (Paldam 2001).
Income and Asset Inequality
A large literature emphasizes the rele-
vance of income inequality as a causal factor in
the growth process. High levels of income
inequality are hypothesized to reduce growth
by inﬂuencing the level of savings and invest-
ment; by increasing rent-seeking activities and
policies, such as high marginal tax rates, that
may hinder growth (Persson and Tabellini
1994); by reducing human capital accumula-
tion due to borrowing constraints and indivis-
ibilites in investment (Galor and Zeira 1993);
by reducing the size of markets and the ability
to capture increasing returns (Murphy et al.
1989); by leading to a lack of political consen-
sus and a breakdown of democratic institu-
tions, resulting in reduced investment and
hence growth (Benhabib and Rustichini 1996);
and by reducing the security of property rights
(Keefer and Knack 2000). Some of the earliest
work on income inequality and growth, how-
ever, stresses that rising income levels can affect
income inequality. For example, Kuznets
(1955) hypothesized and observed that income
inequality may rise, along with income levels,
as migration from rural to urban areas initial-
ly widens the rural-urban income divide, but
that income inequality will eventually reach a
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increases further. Aghion et al. (1999), who
review and evaluate some of the growth-
inequality theoretical mechanisms, also empha-
size the two-way relationship. However, they
focus on the issue of technical progress and
inequality, noting in particular that techno-
logical progress that differentially affects pro-
ductivity of different types of labour is a key
source of income inequality.
The empirical evidence on inequality
and growth is mixed. Persson and Tabellini
(1994, 607) ﬁnd that a one-standard-deviation
increase in the income share of the top quin-
tile lowers average annual growth rates by just
under half a percentage point. Alesina and
Rodrik (1994), using different data, ﬁnd a neg-
ative correlation between income inequality
and subsequent economic growth. Perotti
(1996) and Clarke (1995) also ﬁnd evidence of
a negative relationship between growth and
inequality. By contrast, Forbes (2000) ﬁnds a
positive relationship between inequality and
growth using panel data for a cross-section of
countries.
Most empirical testing has focused on the
effect on growth of income inequality rather
than asset inequality, even though the theoreti-
cal models are mostly concerned with asset
inequality. However, some recent empirical
studies — for example, Birdsall and Londoño
(1997), Deininger and Squire (1998) and
Deininger and Olinto (2000) — examine the
role of asset inequality in growth equations.
Deininger and Olinto, using a Gini coefficient
for land distribution as a measure of asset
inequality in a cross-country analysis, ﬁnd that
asset inequality has a statistically signiﬁcant and
relatively large negative effect on growth but
that income inequality does not. As with the
measure of ethnolinguistic diversity, the empir-
ical studies tend to focus on the effects of
inequality measures on overall economic growth
rather than on TFP, which is emphasized in
social divergence arguments.
Educational Inequality
Building on the relevance of human cap-
ital for growth and productivity (see Temple
2000 for a recent survey), there is a growing
literature on the potential effects of education-
al inequality on levels or growth rates of out-
put per capita. The usual argument (e.g., López
et al. 1998) is that non-market mechanisms,
and factors such as parental income, supply
constraints and location, determine the alloca-
tion of education. As a result, there are likely
to be signiﬁcant differences in marginal prod-
ucts of education across individuals that are not
explainable in terms of variation in ability.
This implies that the distribution of education
will affect the level of output per capita. A
complementary explanation, suggested by the
social divergence approach, is that education-
al inequality, a proxy for social divergence,
hampers the transfer of information and ideas.
Birdsall and Londoño (1997) ﬁnd that
initial levels of educational inequality, meas-
ured by the standard deviation of schooling,
are signiﬁcantly correlated with subsequent
economic growth. More recently, Gini coeffi-
cients for education have been constructed
using different vintages of the Barro and Lee
(1993, 1996, 2001) data on educational
attainment. López et al. (1998) estimate edu-
cational Gini coefficients for 12 countries,
expanded to 20 countries in the work report-
ed in Thomas, Dailami, et al. (2000). Thomas,
Wang, et al. (2000) calculate educational Gini
coefficients for 85 countries, covering a wide
range of developing and developed economies,
for the period 1960-90. The (preliminary)
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suggests that growth in income per capita
is negatively associated with educational
inequality. This ﬁnding is supported by the
results of Castelló and Doménech (2001),
who calculate educational Gini coefficients
and the distribution of education by quin-
tiles, from the Barro and Lee (2001) data,
for 108 countries at ﬁve-year intervals from
1960 to 2000 and report a tendency for
educational inequality to decline in most
countries. For the full sample, which
includes wide diversity in levels of develop-
ment, there is a strong negative (though
seemingly non-linear) association between
average years of schooling and educational
Gini values.
While countries with lower levels of
human capital can have markedly different dis-
tributions of education with comparable average
years of schooling, economies with higher levels
of human capital (average years of schooling)
have relatively equal distributions. In OECD
economies, therefore, compared to developing
economies, educational inequality may have less
effect on growth, independent of the level of
human capital. By contrast, issues of quality and
type of education and training, which are not
captured in the average years of schooling
measures, are likely to be more important in
developed economies.
National Boundaries
National boundaries are a deﬁning fea-
ture of national identity and hence a potential
impediment to communication, particularly
when reinforced by language differences. This
may be one reason why trade densities are so
much greater within countries than across
countries and why distance effects are many
times larger than can be explained by trans-
portation costs (Hazledine 2000; Helliwell
and Verdier 2001).
Many authors have assessed the effects
of trade orientation on economic perform-
ance. Most of the empirical studies have used
cross-sectional data and analysed the effect in
terms of economic growth (Dollar 1992;
Harrison 1996; Edwards 1998). Miller and
Upadhyay (2000) speciﬁcally address the
effect on TFP of human capital and openness
to trade in a pooled cross-section of countries
using time-series data. They ﬁnd that the
greater the openness, the higher the level of
TFP — a result that holds for low-, middle-
and high-income countries.
Connections Between Indicators
The different indicators of social diver-
gence are clearly not independent. Ethnic, lin-
guistic and religious differences will sometimes
be correlated, although, surprisingly, there is
only a small positive correlation between meas-
ures of income and human capital inequality
(Castelló and Doménech 2001). Further, in sit-
uations where, for example, income inequality
and ethnic diversity coexist, their negative
effects on economic performance can be mutu-
ally reinforcing.
Easterly (2001b) presents evidence of a
“middle-class consensus.” In a cross-country
context, consensus is deﬁned as a high share of
income for the middle of the income distribu-
tion (quantiles 2 to 4) and a low level of ethnic
division (measured by an ELF index). Easterly
ﬁnds that such a measure is positively associat-
ed with the level and growth rate of income per
capita, levels of educational and health com-
ponents of human capital, infrastructure, a
range of indicators of favourable economic pol-
icy, democracy, political stability, urbanization
and proxies for a more “modern” economy.
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Measures
In summing up the empirical literature,
we should acknowledge that the chosen prox-
ies for social divergence in empirical work
measure “objective divergence” rather than
“subjective divergence.” Objective divergence
could be thought of as the number and size of
gaps between individuals, or social distance.
For example, educational diversity is a function
of both the number of educational groups and
the objective distance (in terms of years of
schooling) between groups. The subjective
component of social divergence refers to how
large a gap this creates between individuals in
terms of barriers to communication, which can
differ across time and space. It is possible that
in some societies university graduates do not
interact with the unschooled and in some soci-
eties they do. To give a different example, the
Catholic-Protestant distinction is more likely
to create barriers to communication in Ulster
than in Ontario.
14 Although subjective diver-
gence is not unimportant, it is not clear how it
could be measured in an aggregate cross-coun-
try context. In the following section, we
address the issue of measurement and the sig-
niﬁcance of objective measures of social diver-




Despite the huge literature relating
social factors to various measures of produc-
tivity, only one study has empirically tested
for the signiﬁcance of social divergence on
TFP. This study, Grafton et al. (2001),
regresses the Hall and Jones (1999) estimates
of TFP on proxy measures for social divergence
using data for a cross-section of 31 developing
countries,
15 and tests whether the broad objec-
tive measures of social divergence have a sig-
niﬁcant and negative effect on TFP. The
chosen measures of social divergence used in
the study include an ELF index, an index of
religious homogeneity, a measure of educa-
tional distance and a Gini coefficient for per-
sonal expenditure.
16 The results suggest,
separate from any effects due to factor accu-
mulation, that higher levels of social diver-
gence are associated with lower levels of TFP
and that these effects are quantitatively sig-
niﬁcant.
Using a much larger cross section of
countries than in Grafton et al. (2001), we
investigate here the association between esti-
mates of output per worker (or labour produc-
tivity) and TFP (Hall and Jones 1999) and
various indicators of social divergence.
17 The
chosen indicators are a measure of religious
homogeneity, an educational Gini, a land-own-
ership Gini and an ELF index. The religious
homogeneity measure (RH) is constructed for
1980 from data presented in Barrett (1982).
This index measures the probability that two
randomly selected individuals will have the
same religious affiliation. The educational Gini
is for 1990 and the data are obtained from
Castelló and Doménech (2001). The land-own-
ership Gini data are from the period 1960-70
and come from Deininger and Olinto (2000).
The ELF index is for 1960 and uses data from
Mauro (1995) measuring the probability that
two randomly selected individuals in a coun-
try belong to different ethnolinguistic groups.
With the exception of religious homogeneity,
increases in the measures correspond to increas-
es in social divergence. Thus, we would expect
a positive correlation for TFP and labour
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geneity and a negative correlation with all the
other variables. The number of countries with
data available to test the association between
TFP and the measures of social divergence are:
96 (religious homogeneity), 95 (educational
Gini), 52 (land-ownership Gini) and 100 (ELF
index).
Total Factor Productivity
We present simple correlations and
bivariate scatter plots between the chosen meas-
ures of social divergence and the (natural log of)
estimates of TFP for 1988 from Hall and Jones
(1999).
18 At best, such an exercise can be only
suggestive; the existence of a statistically sig-
niﬁcant negative correlation between ln(TFP)
and a measure of social divergence does not nec-
essarily imply a causal relationship. The corre-
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Scatter Plot of Ethnolinguistic
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Scatter Plot of Land-Ownership (LO) Gini
and TFP
lations between ln(TFP) and the measures of
social divergence are 0.256 (religious homo-
geneity), -0.521 (educational Gini), -0.515
(ELF index) and -0.061 (land-ownership Gini).
Scatter plots of the relationships are presented
in Charts 1 to 4. With the exception of the
land-ownership Gini, there appears to be a sub-
stantial association between TFP and the meas-
ures of social divergence.
Labour Productivity
Estimates of output per worker, here-
in deﬁned as labour productivity, for 1990
come from the Penn World Tables v5.6.
Correlations between labour productivity and
the measures of social divergence are 0.160
(religious homogeneity), -0.715 (education-
al Gini), -0.130 (land-ownership Gini) and 
-0.452 (ELF index). Scatter plots of the
Grafton et al. text  11/27/02  2:18 PM  Page 215associations are provided in Charts 5 to 8.
The correlations suggest that the measures of
social divergence are associated with labour
productivity.
Empirical Relationships
To quantify the importance of meas-
ures of social divergence for TFP and
labour productivity, a model of the empir-
ical relationship should be estimated. In
such a model, Grafton et al. (2001) com-
pare the predicted mean TFP levels of
countries in the highest and lowest quar-
tile of countries sorted in ascending order
for their measures of social divergence. For
each of their explanatory variables (reli-
gious homogeneity, ELF index and a per-
sonal expenditure Gini), they found that
the mean TFP levels of those countries in
the lowest quartile in terms of social diver-
gence were, on average, more than twice
those of countries in the highest quartile.
Their simulation results imply that, for the
countries in their sample, those with the
highest levels of social divergence could
double their levels of TFP (and hence
labour productivity) if they could reduce
their levels of social divergence to those of
the low-social-divergence countries.
The associations between social diver-
gence and TFP (and labour productivity) and
the empirical work of Grafton et al. (2001) are
consistent with the hypothesized productivity-
social divergence relationships. Nevertheless,
there are alternative explanations for the results,
especially in terms of the association between
social divergence and output per worker. For
example, the social capital literature indicates
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lower levels of trust, which, in turn, is correlat-
ed with lower growth rates (Zak and Knack
2001). In addition, Hall and Jones (1999) have
developed the concept of social infrastructure,
which combines an index of government antidi-
version policies and the level of openness to
international trade. Antidiversion policies are
deﬁned as those which divert resources from
their most productive use (e.g., distortionary
taxes, trade barriers and corrupt practices).
19
They ﬁnd that their measure of social infra-
structure is the primary determinant of total
output per worker in a sample of 79 countries.
Whatever the explanation or mix of factors, the
empirical evidence suggests that measures of
social divergence, civic social capital (especial-
ly trust) and public social capital (especially cor-
ruption) have a signiﬁcant effect on economic
performance.
Further work is, however, needed to
provide more robust evidence for a causal
relationship
20 between social divergence and
economic performance using a sample of
both rich and poor nations. Such a study
could test for differences between rich and
poor nations and determine whether, for
example, the higher levels of education over-
all and mass communications in richer
nations mitigate the negative effects of social
divergence.
IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY 
AND FUTURE RESEARCH
The hypothesis that social barriers to
communication across social groups can affect
productivity requires further study. In partic-
ular, our chosen indicators of social divergence
are proxies for the number of groups (religious
homogeneity, ELF index) and distance between
social groups (educational Gini, land-owner-
ship Gini); they do not distinguish between
subjective and objective divergence because
they are not direct measures of the number or
quality of links or exchanges across individu-
als. For example, impediments to knowledge
spillovers at the micro level would include
those that separate scholars in different disci-
plines. Such differences would not be identi-
ﬁed with broad societal measures of social
divergence, but could be important because of
the potentially signiﬁcant synergies and cross-
fertilization of ideas from interdisciplinary
activities and communication.
Ideally, physical measures of the quanti-
ty and quality of exchanges within and across
social groups would more directly indicate the
impact of social divergence, enhancing our abil-
ity to discriminate between a social divergence
explanation of the associations reported and
other explanations. On a micro level, physical
measures of exchange could include the num-
ber, direction and connectivity of electronic
mail within organizations. Such measures could
reveal the existence of clusters of communica-
tions and provide evidence of like-with-like
groups within the organizational network that
may be similar to the notion of self-forming neigh-
bourhoods (Schelling 1978). Where such meas-
ures exist, they could provide evidence of social
barriers to communication that may affect micro-
level productivity. For example, The Economist
(2001) reports on work at CERN (the European
particle-physics laboratory) indicating that com-
munications links established for past research
projects persist and may hinder the development
of links required for new research projects.
Further work on social divergence might
include its relationship to the emergence of com-
plex social systems. For instance, in the world of
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of building activities depend upon the nest struc-
ture itself, in a process called stigmergy (Bonabeau
et al. 1999). To the extent that social groups are
self-organized, in the sense that complex behav-
iour can arise from simple individual interac-
tions, the interplay of the physical structures of
communication and individual interactions may
help determine the level and quality of inter- and
intra-group interactions on a societal level. For
example, the number and diversity of languages
in the highlands of Papua New Guinea are a
result of high and steep mountains that have hin-
dered trade and communication between settle-
ments for thousands of years. Even in a modern
economy with a well-developed infrastructure,
geographical features may result in differential
access to modes of communication, thus rein-
forcing existing like-with-like social interactions
on a regional level or accentuating a rural-urban
divide. Physical and human geography also
determine population density, which may, in
turn, inﬂuence the number and quality of inter-
actions between individuals and thus the social
barriers to communication.
Another issue worthy of further research
is whether social divergence can explain the
self-organization of social networks with clus-
ters of like-with-like interactions. For instance,
geographically localized knowledge about
domestic patents and patent citations (Jaffe et
al. 1993) is economically important and pro-
vides evidence for the importance of localized
networks. Further, agglomeration economies
that explain why ﬁrms of a similar type locate
near each other may simply be manifestations
of spillovers that arise when social barriers to
communication are lowered due to proximity
and increased social exchange. In this sense,
social divergence provides a social analogue to
the self-organizing behaviour found in large
networks with a complex topology. In such
networks, as when ﬁrms preferentially locate
with like ﬁrms or when innovations are local-
ized and clustered, new connections are pref-
erentially linked to vertices/points/agents that
already have a large number of connections
(Barabási and Albert 1999).
If further work supports our hypothesis,
especially concerning the existence of a signiﬁ-
cant relationship between social divergence and
TFP in both rich and poor countries, our study
could have important policy implications, in
particular for how policy-makers might increase
productivity for a given level of social diver-
gence. Easterly (2001a) observes that improve-
ments in the quality of institutions can mitigate
the potentially negative effects of ethnic diver-
sity on economic performance. In reference to
social divergence, we might argue that
economies with well-developed mass commu-
nications and physical infrastructure can increase
communication and exchange across social
groups for a given level of social divergence.
Similarly, comprehensive schooling and inclu-
sive and outward-focused curricula, cross-cul-
tural and cross-religious exchanges, and support
for common national languages may also reduce
social barriers to communication.
21 Thus, there
are social and economic policies that can increase
exchange across social groups. Indeed, to some
extent such policies have been pursued in
Canada and other countries, but for social rather
than economic reasons. For example, Canada’s
policy of multiculturalism is intended to pro-
mote cross-cultural understanding, while one of
the aims of bilingualism is to overcome the
communication barriers of the English-French
divide. The postulated social divergence-pro-
ductivity relationship would suggest that such
policies could also help raise Canada’s long-term
level of TFP.
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This chapter presents preliminary evi-
dence on the hypothesis that social divergence,
the social barriers to communication across
social groups, inhibits the exchange of pro-
ductivity-enhancing ideas in an economy.
Using cross-country data we ﬁnd an association
between three proxies of social divergence and
TFP and labour productivity. This ﬁnding is
supported by regressions in a smaller sample
of poor countries that indicate a statistically
and economically signiﬁcant negative rela-
tionship between measures of social divergence
and TFP (Grafton et al. 2001).
If the productivity-social divergence
hypothesis is supported in further empirical
work, especially in rich and poor countries,
it provides a number of important policy
implications. First and foremost is the impli-
cation that policies to lower social barriers to
communication may have a substantial eco-
nomic payoff in terms of higher TFP and
labour productivity. Such policies could
include raising the level of mass communi-
cations and improving physical infrastructure
to mitigate social barriers to communication,
developing school curricula that foster an
open and outward-oriented approach to
learning, cross-cultural and cross-religious
exchanges, and language training for recent
immigrants. To some extent, Canada has
implemented such policies, but to achieve
social rather than economic objectives. Our
study suggests that, if bilingualism has
helped to overcome linguistic divisions and
if multiculturalism has promoted cross-cul-
tural understanding, these cornerstones of
Canada’s cultural policies may have impor-
tant economic beneﬁts by raising the long-
term level of TFP.
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anonymous reviewer for helpful comments on earlier
versions of the paper. Authorship is alphabetical.
1 TFP is an index of how efficiently inputs (such as
labour, human capital and physical capital) are
transformed into ﬁnal goods and services. For example,
if country A requires twice as many inputs to produce
a given level of output as country B, then country A’s
level of TFP is only half that of country B’s.
2 A recent and detailed review of Canadian
productivity performance is provided by Baldwin et
al. (2001). Sharpe (2001) provides a useful
comparison of the economic and productivity trends
in Canada and the United States over the 1990s.
3 Dasgupta (2000) notes that networks that act as
“economic enclaves” can retard economic
development by constraining the ﬂow of resources
(labour, ﬁnancial capital, knowledge, ideas, etc.)
across groups, creating inefficiency.
4 In the terminology of social network analysis (Scott
2000), Figure 2 may be described as a 1-clique of
size 4 in that all points (individuals) in the graph are
directly connected with each other.
5 For instance, in an economy with 100 individuals and
zero social communication costs, the maximum
number of pair-wise communication links is 4,950. If
the same economy had just two social groups (and no
communication links across groups) the maximum
number of pair-wise links is 2,450, with 10 groups the
maximum number of links is 450 and with 100 groups
the number of links is zero. As M increases, other
things may not remain equal; as M ➾ N, barriers
between groups may be lessened as the situation starts
to approximate that of M heterogeneous individuals
rather than M “groups.”
6 For instance, J.S. Mill (1848) shrewdly observed that
“it is hardly possible to overrate the value…of placing
human beings in contact with persons dissimilar to
themselves, and with modes of thought and action
unlike those with which they are familiar” (594).
7 Gradstein and Justman (2000) adopt a similar stance. In
their model, the productivity of a transaction reﬂects the
balance between the probability of a “successful” transaction,
which decreases with social (or “cultural”) distance, and the
conditional productivity of the transaction, which may
increase with social distance. Like us, they assume that,
beyond some relatively low level of social distance,
productivity is a decreasing function of social distance.
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“social cohesion” is a “contested concept,” the
interpretation of which can depend on different
underlying theoretical traditions. Given the breadth
of interest from different disciplines, and from
policy-makers as well as academics, the lack of
consensus is not altogether surprising.
9 In Woolcock’s (2001) view, “there is an emerging
consensus on the deﬁnition of social capital… social
capital refers to the norms and networks that
facilitate collective action” (70).
10 An alternative, broader view of social divergence
would be as an umbrella concept that emphasizes the
effects of different dimensions of social distance on
productivity and growth. However, as discussed
below, there are several hypothesized mechanisms by
which each of the different dimensions of social
distance affect economic performance, so an
encompassing view would be subject to the same
criticisms applied above to social capital and social
cohesion.
11 Easterly (2001c) succinctly summarizes this view:
“divided societies’ governments face incentives to
redistribute existing income. In more cohesive
societies, governments face incentives to promote
development” (256).
12 By contrast, Lian and Oneal (1997) construct their
own index of diversity, which includes (equally
weighted and standardized) components for ethnic,
linguistic and religious diversity, and ﬁnd that it is
not statistically signiﬁcant in an otherwise
conventional growth regression.
13 There is some debate over whether fragmentation or
inequality (as measured by the ELF index),
polarization (which is maximized with only two
different groups) or dominance (measured by the
proportion of the population in the largest ethnic
group) is the most relevant aspect in assessing the
effects of ethnic division on economic performance
(Collier 2001).
14 We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for this
point.
15 To reduce the potential overlap with mechanisms
that affect factor accumulation (labour, physical
capital and human capital), Grafton et al. (2001)
focus speciﬁcally on the effects of proxies for social
divergence on TFP.
16 The exclusion of developed countries and the small
sample are a consequence of the decision to use only
consistently measured data for expenditure
inequality that are also labelled “reliable.”
17 Sargent and Rodriguez (2000) observe that both TFP
and labour productivity are appropriate productivity
measures. Where the interest is over long periods of
time (greater than 10 years), TFP may be a better
choice provided that capital stock data are
comparable across countries.
18 Note that the associations summarized are based on
variation across countries, not over time. Such
correlations should be relatively robust to the
different dates at which the indicators of divergence
are measured as these vary relatively little over time
compared to their variation across countries.
19 Hall and Jone’s index of government antidiversion
policies is, for each country, an equally weighted
average of ﬁve ratings related to law and order,
bureaucratic quality, corruption, risk of
appropriation and government repudiation of
contracts, compiled by Political Risk Services.
20 See, for example, Durlauf’s (2002) critique of
Putnam’s (2000) empirical evidence.
21 These policies are complementary to those reviewed
by Helliwell (2001) for Canada from a social capital
perspective.
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